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Abstract   The use of artificial intelligence (AI) in healthcare is one of the fastest 
growing industries worldwide.  AI is already used to deliver services as diverse 
as symptom checking, skin cancer screening, and recognition of sepsis.  But is it 
safe to use AI in patient care?  However, the evidence base is narrow and limited, 
frequently restricted to small studies considering the performance of AI applica-
tions at isolated tasks.  In this paper we argue that greater consideration should 
be given to how the AI will be integrated into clinical processes and health ser-
vices, because it is at this level that human factors challenges are likely to arise.  
We use the example of autonomous infusion pumps in intensive care to analyse 
the human factors challenges of using AI for patient care.  We outline potential 
strategies to address these challenges, and we discuss how such strategies and 
approaches could be applied more broadly to AI technologies used in other do-
mains.
1 Introduction 
Expectations for the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in healthcare are high.  In 
the UK, as well as world-wide, politicians and policy makers are quick to high-
light the potential health and economic benefits that the widespread adoption of 
AI can bring.  This is underpinned by the establishment of new dedicated bodies, 
such as NHSX1 in the UK and significant government funding to facilitate and 
speed up the development and adoption of AI in health services.  AI is a major 
disrupter to health systems, and it will transform the way healthcare is delivered 
and accessed by patients (Coiera, 2018).   
Examples of the use of AI in healthcare include machine learning algorithms 
that rely on pattern recognition, classification and prediction.  For example, deep 
learning is particularly well suited to the interpretation of radiological images 
                                                          
1
 https://www.nhsx.nhs.uk/ 
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because of the complexity and richness of the data (Saria et al., 2018).  Deep 
neural networks (DNN) have been used to interpret head CT scans (Chilamkurthy 
et al., 2018), to identify skin cancer (Haenssle et al., 2018) and to recognise dia-
betes (Avram et al., 2019).  AI-driven chatbots are another popular application 
domain, e.g. patient-facing symptom checkers (Semigran et al., 2015) or artificial 
agents delivering cognitive behavioural therapy to mental health patients (Fitz-
patrick et al., 2017).  
Evaluation studies of such AI algorithms have produced encouraging results.  
The evaluation of a bedside computer vision algorithm to identify and monitor 
behaviours of clinicians, such as hand washing, suggests that the algorithm can 
achieve 95% accuracy (Yeung et al., 2018).  Skin cancer detection using algo-
rithms might outperform dermatologists at this task (Esteva et al., 2017).  Simi-
larly, the developers of a DNN to detect diabetic retinopathy2 found their algo-
rithm achieved over 95% accuracy on two test sets (Gulshan et al., 2016).  For 
the management of sepsis, the evaluation carried out by the developers of an al-
gorithm trained by reinforcement learning found that on average patient mortality 
ZDVORZHUZKHQFOLQLFLDQV¶PDQDJHPent decisions matched those suggested by 
the AI (Komorowski et al., 2018).       
However, looking across these studies, the focus of the evaluation is usually 
on the performance of the AI on a narrowly defined task.  The evaluation is typ-
ically undertaken by the developers, and independent evaluation remains the ex-
ception.  For example, the above evaluation of AI sepsis management has been 
FULWLFLVHGEHFDXVHWKHDOJRULWKPVHHPLQJO\³OHDUQHG´QRWWRWUHDWYHU\LOOSDWLHQWV
± a strategy that fits with the training reward function, but is hardly suitable in a 
real clinical environment (Jeter et al., 2019).  Sample sizes are often small, and 
prospective trials are infrequent.  As a result, the evidence base to date about the 
actual performance of AI in real-world settings remains weak (Yu and Kohane, 
2019).   
There is relatively little evidence about the safety of using AI for patient care, 
and we argue that this is, in part, due to the focus on performance of the algo-
rithms.  The real challenges for the adoption of AI will arise when algorithms are 
integrated into clinical systems to deliver a service in collaboration with clini-
cians as well as other technology (Sujan et al., 2019d).  It is at this clinical system 
level, where teams consisting of healthcare professionals and AI systems coop-
erate and collaborate to provide a service, that human factors challenges will 
come to the fore (Sujan et al., 2019b).   
In this paper we analyse the human factors challenges of using AI for patient 
care as part of a clinical system, and we identify potential strategies for address-
ing these.  The next section describes the scenario of autonomous infusion pumps 
in intensive care, which we use to illustrate the concepts.  In section 3 we analyse 
                                                          
2
 Diabetic retinopathy is a condition of the eye that can affect people with diabetes.  It is a 
leading cause of sight loss and blindness in the UK.   
Human Factors of Using Artificial Intelligence for Patient Care   311 
 
the scenario for human factors challenges and develop example strategies for 
dealing with them.  In Section 4 we discuss how the identified strategies could 
be applied more broadly to AI systems used in other domains.  We conclude the 
paper with a summary and outlook.           
2 Scenario: Autonomous Infusion Pumps in Intensive Care 
As a reference case we use a scenario developed within the Safety Assurance of 
Autonomous Intravenous Medication Management Systems (SAM) project 
(Sujan et al., 2019a).  The SAM project3 is funded under the Assuring Autonomy 
International Programme (AAIP)4, and it is a collaboration between Human Re-
liability Associates (a human factors and safety consultancy), NHS Digital (an 
arms-length body of the Department of Health), and clinicians based at Royal 
Derby Hospital.  The project explores safety assurance strategies for novel, 
highly-automated or autonomous infusion pumps within the intensive care set-
ting.  Figure 1 provides an illustration of the intensive care setting.     
 
 
Fig. 1. Simulated patient in intensive care.  The patient is on a ventilator.  The stack of infu-
sion pumps is on the left, next to the screen that charts the patient's data. 
 
The motivation for considering the use of AI for intravenous medication man-
agement is twofold: to reduce medication errors, and to improve efficiency and 
                                                          
3
 http://www.humanreliability.com/casestudies/sam_project/ 
4
 https://www.york.ac.uk/assuring-autonomy/ 
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effectiveness.  Medication errors are a significant problem for the National Health 
Service (NHS), and health systems world-wide.  A 2018 report estimates that as 
many as 237 million medication errors occur in England every year, and that 
these cause over 700 deaths (Elliott et al., 2018).  Intravenous medication prepa-
ration and administration are particularly vulnerable activities, and therefore such 
infusion errors represent a considerable burden to patients and the health system 
(McLeod et al., 2013, Furniss et al., 2019).   
In order to reason about the capabilities of automated and autonomous infu-
sion pumps we took inspiration from the automotive domain, where a 6-level 
taxonomy of driver-vehicle control was developed by the Society of Automotive 
Engineers (SAE), which ranges from no automation (level 0) through to full au-
tomation (level 5).  We used this approach and developed analogous levels of 
automation for infusion pumps, as shown in figure 2.  Level 2 represents current 
smart pump capabilities, where the pump is able to undertake a number of auto-
mated checks, e.g. drug and patient identification.  At level 5, which represents 
the scenario of future AI technology considered in this paper, an autonomous 
infusion pump is able to take clinical guidelines (e.g. for insulin administration) 
as a starting point, but has the ability to learn and modify these based on contin-
XRXVPRQLWRULQJRIWKHSDWLHQW¶VSK\VLRORJLFDOUHVSRQVHWRWKHGUXJ:HFRQVLGHU 
the reference scenario described in Table  1.   
 
Table 1. Reference Scenario 
Reference Scenario: L5 Infusion Pump 
The patient is a 68-year old type II diabetic with sepsis secondary to pneumonia.  The 
SDWLHQW¶VEOood sugars require insulin control via IV actrapid insulin infusion.  Patient iden-
tity, nurse identity, prescription and syringe formulation checks are all done by barcode.  If 
checks match, the pump automatically programmes itself to start the infusion, displays 
medication identity and selects hard and soft programme infusion rate limits without fur-
ther or final human confirmation.  The pump controls the IV infusion rate of insulin in 
response to continuously measured blood sugar from a central venous sampling device.  
:LWKLQWKHSURJUDPPHGOLPLWVLWLVDEOHWR³OHDUQ´WKHSDWLHQW¶VDFWXDOLQVXOLQUHTXLUHPHQWV
and formulate an individualised protocol for the infusion rate based on the sugar readings 
to optimise sugars control through pre-emptive changes in infusion rates. 
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Fig. 2. Levels of Automation - Infusion Pumps 
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3 Human Factors Analysis 
We undertook a human factors analysis of the reference scenario in order to iden-
tify human factors challenges that might impact on safe and effective care.  The 
focus of the analysis was the clinical system, which includes consideration of 
how clinicians interact with the AI infusion pump, other tools and systems that 
might communicate with the infusion pump and clinicians, the impact on team-
work and the organisation of work, and the impact on communication with pa-
tients and patient experience.  This socio-technical unit of analysis is shown in 
figure 3. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Socio-technical system unit of analysis 
 
As part of the analysis we undertook a task analysis of the current process as 
baseline.  This was mapped using the Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) ap-
proach (Stanton, 2006).  We undertook a human failure analysis using the Sys-
tematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Approach (SHERPA) methodol-
ogy (Embrey, 1986).  We then mapped the future state that incorporates the au-
tonomous infusion pump.  The process map is shown in figure 5 in the appendix.  
The analysis involved a clinical team consisting of a consultant anaesthetist, an 
intensive care nurse and a pharmacist.  We also interviewed 10 further clinicians 
about their views on the potential impact of using autonomous infusion pumps in 
intensive care.  
The human factors analysis identified a number of human factors challenges 
that need to be considered and addressed in order to provide assurance that the 
AI can be integrated safely into a clinical system, and that the overall service is 
safe.  An overview of the human factors challenges is given in table 2.  The table 
contextualises the identified human factors challenges within the autonomous in-
fusion pump example.      
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Table 2. Human factors challenges 
HF 
Challenge 
Description Example 
Handover The autonomous system needs 
to be able to recognise its own 
performance boundaries, pro-
ject into the future clinical sce-
narios that will be beyond its 
performance boundaries, and 
identify suitable ways to hand 
over control to the clinician.   
Handover includes considera-
tion of: (a) when to hand over; 
(b) whom to hand over to; (c) 
what to hand over; and (d) how 
to hand over.   
7KHSDWLHQW¶VEORRGVXJDUOHYHOVGRQRWUH
spond sufficiently to the insulin given by the 
autonomous infusion pump.  The pump pre-
dicts and recognises that it will not be able 
WRFRQWUROWKHSDWLHQW¶VEORRGVXJDU7KH
pump triggers an alert on the electronic 
health record, raises an audible alarm, and 
requests the nurse to take over.  The nurse 
can review the reason for the alert, the his-
WRU\RIWKHSXPS¶VLQVXOLQPDQDJHPHQWDQG
its projection into the future, and act accord-
ingly.     
Perfor-
mance 
Variability 
Clinicians need to manage com-
peting organisational priorities 
and operational demands.  They 
use their experience and judge-
ment to make trade-offs based 
on the requirements of a spe-
cific situation.  The autono-
mous system needs to support 
rather than constrain this per-
formance variability and adap-
tive capacity.   
The nurse realises that insulin has not yet 
been prescribed for the patient even though 
they will likely need it.  The nurse goes and 
finds the doctor, explains the situation, and 
the doctor issues a verbal medication order 
and will follow this up with the written pre-
scription later (performance variability).  
The autonomous system requires an elec-
tronic medication order, but allows for a 
manual override.  The autonomous system 
sends reminders to the doctor with a request 
for completing the electronic medication or-
der.   
Automa-
tion bias 
When a system works well 
most of the time, clinicians start 
to rely on it.  In some situa-
tions, this can lead to overreli-
ance, for example when the sys-
tem takes an inappropriate ac-
tion but the clinician does not 
recognise this because they 
trust the system.   
Due to sepsis the patient requires tighter 
control of blood sugar levels than usual.  
The autonomous system has managed suc-
cessfully septic patients before but, in this 
instance, fails to recognise the need for 
tighter glycaemic control.  The autonomous 
system provides clinician interpretable justi-
fication and explanation of its decisions, and 
the clinician, who has received training on 
potentially inappropriate behaviours of the 
autonomous system, is able to spot the dis-
crepancy and act accordingly.   
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Supervi-
sion 
Clinicians are both users and 
supervisors of the autonomous 
system.  They need to under-
stand not only how to operate 
the autonomous system (e.g. 
loading a syringe), but also how 
to recognise potential failure 
modes or deviations from ap-
propriate behaviour or changes 
in the environment that might 
move the autonomous system 
outside of its design envelope.   
The autonomous infusion pump is operating 
on the sliding scale algorithm for adminis-
WHULQJLQVXOLQ,WFODVVLILHVWKHSDWLHQW¶VUH
sponse to the current insulin infusion as re-
quiring transition to another scale with 70%, 
as opposed to 30% for staying within the 
current scale.  The autonomous system initi-
DWHVDQGWKHWUDQVLWLRQDQGDFWLYDWHVDQ³XQ
FHUWDLQW\PDUNHU´WRDOHUWWKHFOLQLFLDQ 
  
3.1 Handover 
Handover between clinicians has long been recognised as a safety-critical and 
particularly vulnerable activity (Sujan et al., 2015b).  Handover is not simply the 
transfer of information from a sender to a more or less passive receiver, but in-
volves collaboration, negotiation and coordination (Sujan et al., 2015c).  The in-
troduction of AI and autonomous systems complicates handover even further, as 
the AI needs to identify appropriate trigger points for handover, it needs to deter-
mine the appropriate person or persons to hand over to and understand their in-
formation needs, and it needs to use adequate communication channels for the 
handover.  Such trigger points could be the self-detection of an internal fault or 
WKHUHFRJQLWLRQRIVLWXDWLRQVRXWVLGHRIWKHV\VWHP¶VGHVLJQHQYHORSH)RUH[DP
ple, should the autonomous infusion pump wait to raise an alert until it fails to 
control the SDWLHQW¶VEORRGVXJDU OHYHOVRU VKRXOG LW FRPPXQLFDWH LWVSRWHQWLDO
failure much sooner to allow clinicians to prepare for taking back control?  
Should it just raise an alert or should it communicate a history of its actions and 
a prognosis of the patient¶VSK\VLRORJLFDOGHYHORSPHQW"6KRXOGLWVRXQGDQDX
dible alarm so that the nurse can pick this up, or should it send a text message to 
doctors not close to the bedside?   
All of these considerations are human factors concerns, and a look at the wider 
human factors body of knowledge can provide insight into potential approaches 
for designing adequate handover strategies.  For example, the autonomous infu-
sion pump would ideally initiate a form of graceful handover, where the trigger 
points are determined considering human performance characteristics as well as 
the specific clinical scenario.  The design of the infusion pump should consider 
the information needs of different types of stakeholders that allows them to build 
an adequate situation awareness (Endsley, 1995).  Alarm prioritisation and alarm 
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management are further strategies that have been developed in control room op-
erations to prevent operator overload (e.g. EEMUA 191 Alarm Systems5), and 
these should also inform the way the handover between the autonomous infusion 
pump and clinicians is designed.       
3.2 Performance Variability 
Within the resilience engineering (RE) community performance variability is re-
garded as an asset that enables complex systems to deal with disturbances, con-
flicting goals, and unforeseen situations (Hollnagel et al., 2006).  People contin-
uously adapt their behaviour and make trade-offs, often based on some form of 
subjective risk assessment, and in this way they are able to cope with competing 
demands, uncertainty, and everyday disturbances such as staff shortages and 
peaks in demand (Sujan et al., 2015a).  This work-as-done (WAD) is necessarily 
different from work-as-imagined (WAI) by people who design and manage sys-
tems (Hollnagel, 2015).      
Our human factors analysis provided several examples of such everyday local 
adaptations.  For example, nurses would sometimes administer drugs without a 
prescription and then chase the doctor to issue a prescription later.  They do this 
depending on the perceived risk category of the drug, the urgency of administer-
ing the drug, the availability of the doctor, and their own workflows.  This vio-
lates the protocol, which requires that a prescription is issued prior to administra-
tion of any drug, but it enables smoother functioning of the intensive care unit as 
a whole, and it can adapt better to patient needs.   
Safety assurance of new technology focuses frequently only on the failure 
modes of the technology and the associated risks.  However, from a Safety-II 
perspective it is equally as important to consider the impact on the resilience abil-
ities of the (clinical) system, i.e. the impact on the ability to anticipate, to adapt, 
to monitor, and to learn (Hollnagel, 2014). 
In the autonomous infusion pump scenario, it is easy to envisage how the static 
implementation of procedures and protocols might disrupt existing workflows 
and, in this way, create the need for other workarounds. The design of the infu-
sion pump should consider WAD, e.g. with data collected through observations, 
interviews and task analysis.  There is also a need to look beyond the immediate 
impact on human ± machine (i.e. clinician ± infusion pump) interaction, towards 
the potential impact the introduction of technology has on human ± human rela-
tionships.  Building and maintaining such relationships is an important aspect of 
                                                          
5
 Standard available for a fee from the Engineering Equipment and Materials User Association 
(EEMUA): https://www.eemua.org/Products/Publications/Print/EEMUA-Publication-
191.aspx.   
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resilient health care (Sujan et al., 2019c).  The introduction of technology should 
not prevent opportunities for building relationships and trust among clinicians.          
3.3 Automation Bias  
Automation bias describes the phenomenon that people tend to trust and then start 
to rely on automation uncritically (Parasuraman and Riley, 1997).  An interesting 
recent study in the automotive domain found that even with training and specific 
instruction on the limitations of an autonomous vehicle, study participant drivers 
came to rely on the autonomous car within a week, and were spending most of 
their time on their smartphones or reading  (Burnett et al., 2019).  Examples of 
automation bias have also been found in healthcare, for example in mammogra-
phy reading, where the introduction of a computer algorithm can decrease the 
performance of radiologists for certain difficult cases, where the algorithm pro-
vided incorrect classification (Alberdi et al., 2004, Lyell and Coiera, 2016). 
Many, if not most, AI systems will be advertised as having ultra-high reliabil-
ity, and it is to be expected that in due course clinicians will come to rely on these 
systems.  However, the studies on automation bias suggest that the reliability fig-
ures by themselves do not allow prediction of what will happen in clinical use, 
when the clinician is confronted with a potentially inaccurate system output.  It 
is important that clinicians are informed not only about the accuracy of algo-
rithms, but also about their potential weaknesses and what to look out for.   
Guarding against automation bias is not easy.  While studies have suggested a 
number of strategies such as explainability and transparency of decision making, 
clear accountability and adaptive interfaces and task allocation, the evidence base 
for these is far from clear (Goddard et al., 2012).  Different people might have 
different mental models and assumptions of the autonomous infusion system, 
which might be partial and even contradictory, because the behaviour may be too 
complex for anyone to understand what is going on.  Technology developers, 
healthcare providers and clinicians need to have an awareness of this challenge, 
and find solutions that work in their specific setting so that users can build a good 
picture of the behaviour of the autonomous system in a way they can compre-
hend.     
3.4 Supervision 
With current infusion pumps (at L2 in our model of automation) clinicians are 
users of the infusion pump, i.e. they need to know how to load and program the 
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infusion pump.  Failure modes of the infusion pump are fairly limited and rea-
sonably well understood.  The training provided to clinicians is about the func-
tionality of the infusion pump and how to use it, e.g. how to navigate the inter-
face.   
The situation changes dramatically when we move to L5, because at this level 
the infusion pump becomes an autonomous system capable of taking decisions 
independently.  The clinician needs to understand not only how to use the infu-
sion pump, but also what potential weaknesses are and how the safe envelope is 
defined, maintained or breached.  Clinicians need to be able to make sense of the 
SXPS¶VDFWLRQVDQGSURYLGHFOLQLFDOO\-based checks.  In this sense, the role of the 
clinician changes from user of a passive pump to that of supervisor of an auton-
omous system.  Consideration needs to be given to how clinicians can fulfil this 
role, and what kind of novel training needs might arise.  It is even conceivable 
that a new role is created, e.g. that of an AI nurse specialist, who is specifically 
trained in managing AI and autonomous systems within their care setting.   
4 Cross-Domain Discussion 
This paper has identified a number of key human factors challenges through con-
sideration of automation and autonomy in healthcare. Although the specific is-
sues highlighted relate to the introduction of autonomous infusion pumps, the 
general challenges are not unique to this application and domain, and are likely 
to be more broadly applicable. In this section we discuss the generalisability of a 
number of the challenges presented through consideration of examples in other 
domains where the level of autonomy of systems is also increasing. We believe 
that there is great benefit that can be gained through sharing knowledge between 
domains on how to address these challenges. 
4.1 Handover 
The problems associated with handover from autonomous operation to a human 
operator are well known in other domains and have been widely studied. None 
more so than in the automotive domain where recent high-profile incidents have 
highlighted concerns around the use of so-called safety drivers. Current self-driv-
ing cars are only capable of driving autonomously under limited conditions such 
as defined geographical areas, types of roads or specified scenarios and environ-
mental conditions. This means that the vehicle must hand back control to a human 
driver if the required conditions are not met, or if the car is in a situation that it 
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cannot resolve safely. Studies such as (Gold et al., 2013) have shown that, de-
pending on the complexity of the situation at handover, it can take up to 8 seconds 
for a driver to take back full control of the vehicle, particularly if they are dis-
tracted at the time of handover. When driving on a motorway, 8 seconds may 
correspond to over 200 metres travelled. It does not seem unreasonable to take 
the high-end of this estimate. Given that the handover to a safety driver will often 
occur because the vehicle is in a difficult or dangerous state it is likely that the 
situation is complex. The ability of drivers who are not actively engaged in driv-
ing the vehicle to avoid distraction is also challenging, as discussed in (Merat et 
al., 2014). This is an area of active research, but there are certainly strongly held 
views, such as by Waymo (Waymo, 2018) that ultimately human drivers should 
be removed, as they cannot be relied upon to react quickly enough to ensure 
safety. This view has been given additional weight by accidents such as that in 
Tempe, Arizona in March 2018 (National Transportation Safety Board, 2018), 
where for various reasons the safety driver was unable to intervene quickly 
enough to prevent a fatality. 
Human factors strategies such as graceful handover, situational awareness and 
designing with consideration of performance influencing factors, can also be seen 
to be crucial for ensuring safe handover in autonomous driving, and are also more 
broadly applicable to other domains. 
4.2 Automation bias and impact on working practices 
Aircraft have been highly automated for a long time, prompting research to in-
YHVWLJDWHZKDWWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKLVPLJKWEHRQSLORWV¶ ability to fly the air-
craft manually if the automated systems fail. This has been particularly motivated 
by a number of crashes that may have involved some element of de-skilling on 
the part of the pilots, such as Colgan Flight 3407 in 2009 when 50 people died 
when the pilots were found to have done the opposite of what they were trained 
to do when the aircraft entered an aerodynamic stall (National Transportation 
Safety Board, 2009), see figure 4 for an image of the crash site (Clarence Centre, 
New York). The paradox is that it would seem that although automation has made 
it increasingly unlikely that airline pilots will face critical problems during flight, 
it is also perhaps making it less likely they will be able to cope if such problems 
do arise. 
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Fig. 4. Crash site of Colgan Flight 3407 in 2009  
(copyright: Bureau of Aircraft Accident Archives) 
 
A study from 2014 (Casner et al., 2014) set out to understand how the prolonged 
XVHRIFRFNSLWDXWRPDWLRQKDVEHHQDIIHFWLQJSLORWV¶PDQXDO flying skills. They 
did this through experiments on 16 Boeing 747-400 airline pilots in a simulator, 
where they systematically varied the level of automation used to fly routine and 
non-URXWLQHIOLJKWVFHQDULRV:KDWWKH\IRXQGZDVWKDWSLORWV¶LQVWUXPHQW scan-
ning and manual control skills to be mostly intact, even when pilots reported that 
they were infrequently practiced. However, when pilots were asked to manually 
SHUIRUPWKHFRJQLWLYHWDVNVQHHGHGIRUPDQXDOIOLJKWHJWUDFNLQJWKHDLUFUDIW¶V
position without the use of a map display, deciding which navigational steps 
come next, recognizing instrument system failures), more frequent and signifi-
cant problems were observed, and this seemed to depend on the degree to which 
pilots remain actively engaged in supervising the automation. Such observations 
in a domain where the use of high levels of automation are long established 
clearly bring knowledge that may be important for domains such as healthcare 
where high levels of autonomy are novel. 
4.3 Supervision 
In the maritime domain there are ambitious plans for autonomous operation of 
ships. For example, Rolls-Royce plan to operate a fleet of unmanned ships across 
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the world using a small number of operators in shore-based control centres 
(SCCs), which could be located thousands of miles away6. Unmanned shipping 
does not mean removing humans completely from operations, but moving them 
to a role more focussed on monitoring and supervision, requiring entirely new 
kinds of work roles, tasks, tools, training and environments. Crucially, to assure 
safety, people may need to be able to take some level of control over the ship at 
any time. Many of the issues relating to supervision for autonomous medical sys-
tems are therefore relevant here. 
One of the big challenges of such a shift to SCCs is the loss of direct ship-
sense. An investigation conducted in (Man et al., 2016) highlighted how critical 
ship-sense is in ship manoeuvring. They consider how operators in a remote op-
erating centre wiOO EH DEOH WR HIIHFWLYHO\ SHUFHLYH WKH VKLS¶V PRYHPHQWV DQG
manoeuver the ship without ship-sense since there will be no physical connection 
between the human and the vessel, and no directly perceived information from 
WKHVKLS¶VHQYLURQPHQW,Q:DKOVWU|PHWDO, an overview of the human 
factors challenges that might concern future monitoring and control of unmanned 
ships from SCCs is presented. They identify the challenges through consideration 
of autonomous and remote operation across a number of domains including avi-
ation, forestry, subway systems, space and military operations, and contrast these 
to the maritime context. The most prominent issues they identify include infor-
mation overload, boredom, mishaps during changeovers and handoffs, lack of 
feel of the vessel, constant reorientation to new tasks, delays in control and mon-
itoring, and the need for human understanding in local knowledge and object dif-
ferentiation (e.g., in differentiating between help-seekers and pirates). 
5 Conclusion 
There is significant enthusiasm for the use of artificial intelligence in healthcare 
as well as in other industries, and there is no shortage of promise by technology 
developers of how AI can transform overstretched health services and improve 
patient care.  There is also political will to support the development of new tech-
nologies with funding and by opening up relatively closed health systems such 
as the NHS.  On the one hand this is good news, because these developments 
recognise the great potential that AI technologies undoubtedly bring.  On the 
other hand, from a safety assurance perspective there is cause for concern because 
the evidence base on whether and how the introduction of such technologies 
might impact on patient safety is very thin.  Largely, evaluation studies to date 
have considered performance of AI on specific tasks, but have neglected the 
                                                          
6
 Rolls Royce video available at: 
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1&v=vg0A9Ve7SxE  
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wider impact on clinical systems.  One way forward might be to look not at al-
gorithms in isolation, but rather consider the services AI systems are contributing 
to, and how the introduction of novel technologies will change the ways in which 
services are provided.        
Standards and guidance exist, which could form a starting point for more rig-
orous safety assurance of AI technologies, such as established standards for risk 
management of medical devices (ISO 14971) and health information technology 
(NHS Digital clinical safety standards).  However, these standards focus predom-
inantly on technical aspects and do not cover human factors and service issues.  
In addition, many of the technology developers entering the AI healthcare market 
do not come from a safety-critical system engineering background and might be 
largely unfamiliar with existing guidance and best practice.    
There is an opportunity for national bodies such as the Chartered Institute of 
Ergonomics and Human Factors (CIEHF) and the newly established NHSX to 
raise awareness of human factors and safety challenges for the use of AI in 
healthcare, and to develop and disseminate appropriate guidance.  Funding 
should be made available not only for the development of AI technologies, but 
also for their rigours evaluation to ensure we understand from the outset how AI 
will impact on patient care and patient safety, and how potential hazards and hu-
man factors challenges can be addressed.   
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Process map of infusion process with L5 autonomous infusion pump 
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